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Planning for Future Humanitarian Assistance Operations:  
Using the SAO to Establish the NGO Working Relationship

By

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
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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5 February 1999



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**“Unless we grapple with the larger influences that shape and manifest themselves in the NGO/military relationship, that relationship may fail, and our national security may be diminished as well.”**

**“[The] emerging U.S. military/NGO cooperation is not some happenstance of a period of transition. Rather, it is a fundamental characteristic of a new era.”**

**Chris Seiple<sup>1</sup>**

### Introduction

In this paper the author will argue that establishing a positive working relationship between Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will provide the U.S. military and the future Joint Forces Commander (JFC) with a significant force multiplier in humanitarian assistance (HA) operations. This process will allow the unified combatant commanders (CINCs) to more effectively prepare for future HA operations.

This paper will first examine the potential role the SAO can play in HA operations and the U.S. military's guidance in regards to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The paper will also discuss why a positive working relationship between the U.S. military and NGOs is key to the success of HA operations. A presentation of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT, RESTORE HOPE, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, as examples of past HA operations, will provide the important lessons learned in establishing a unity of effort between the U.S. military and NGOs in humanitarian assistance. This paper will then discuss in more depth, why the Security Assistance Officer is a valuable asset to the U.S. military and can play a key role in preparing for future HA operations. Finally, this paper will provide recommendations for establishing the U.S. military/NGO rapport now, and how this can be drawn upon for future humanitarian assistance operations.

## Humanitarian Assistance Operations, the U.S. Military, and NGOs

The lessons the U.S. military has learned in recent humanitarian assistance operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti must be applied in the future to facilitate more effective operations. Improving the relationship between the U.S. military and the numerous nongovernmental organizations with whom the U.S. military interacts during HA operations must be a high priority if these operations are to succeed. This working relationship, primarily focused on achieving consensus, is the key to maintaining a unity of effort in any HA operation. The unified CINCs have an asset at their disposal which is uniquely situated to prepare for future HA operations and improve the relationship between the U.S. military and NGOs. This asset is the Security Assistance Officer.<sup>2</sup> While it is true that SAOs have a dual chain-of-command and are under the supervision of the U.S. Ambassador as well as accountable to the CINC,<sup>3</sup> this relationship between the SAO and NGOs is one that can work to the benefit of the entire Country Team as well as the CINC. SAOs are established in most of the developing countries within a CINC's area of responsibility (AOR). NGOs perform humanitarian and developmental missions in most every developing nation of the world. This potential relationship between SAOs and NGOs can form the basis of an effective U.S. military/NGO working relationship and establish NGOs as a force multiplier for future Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) in humanitarian assistance operations.

Throughout the history of the U.S. military there have been missions that have not met the traditionally accepted concept of warfighting.<sup>4</sup> In the past ten years these missions have gradually been recognized and defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as *Military Operations Other Than War or MOOTW*.<sup>5</sup> One of the more controversial subsets of MOOTW has been humanitarian assistance operations. These operations may take place in the post-hostilities phase

following a conflict, or may be a mission in itself. The U.S. military must break the mindset among its officers and troops that the military exists *only* to fight wars. The bottom line is that the U.S. military exists to support political goals of the United States, whether that be fighting wars or stabilizing developing democracies. The U.S. military must learn not only to *accept* the humanitarian assistance mission, but to *excel* in it. Excellence comes from preparation and planning foresight.

Humanitarian assistance, as a national security priority, is discussed in the National Security Strategy;

*Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian assistance programs, which are designed to alleviate human suffering, to help establish democratic regimes that respect human rights and to pursue appropriate strategies for economic development.<sup>6</sup>*

The end of the Cold War and the increased emphasis of United States' policymakers in promoting democracy throughout the developing world has had a significant impact on today's military. The U.S. military has adjusted the mindset which contrasted the difference between war and MOOTW, and has begun to approach missions as "military operations" without a limiting descriptor.

The U.S. military must be prepared for success, whether winning wars or effectively engaging in humanitarian assistance operations. HA operations require a more proactive planning process than has been accomplished to date. Combatant commanders have an obligation to conduct deliberate planning for all assigned mission contingencies.<sup>7</sup> The CINCs all have an asset at their disposal to assist in the preparation for HA operations, the Security Assistance Officer. Although the SAO is known in different countries by different names,<sup>8</sup> these officers and their staffs are found in most of the developing nations within a CINC's AOR. The SAO can establish liaison, initiate memorandums of understanding (MOUs), review operational

procedures, and develop a rapport with the humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) which are so crucial to the success of humanitarian assistance. These HROs are known variously as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and other international organizations (IOs). Although these groups are all defined in Joint Pub 3-07, this author will use the acronym NGOs to collectively refer to them.<sup>9</sup> The SAO's relationship with NGOs will form the basis of an effective U.S. military/NGO working relationship and establish NGOs as force multipliers for the JFC in future HA operations.

Joint Doctrine discusses the principles of MOOTW. These principles are: *objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy*.<sup>10</sup> In humanitarian assistance operations and in the U.S. military's relationship with NGOs, the most important principle in the successful completion of humanitarian assistance is unity of effort. Unity of effort is defined by Joint Pub 3-07 as *ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose*.<sup>11</sup>

In HA operations the JFC must establish a positive relationship with the NGOs in order to maintain unity of effort in accomplishing the assigned mission. While HA operations may not be the preferred mission of the U.S. military, they are the sole reason for the existence of NGOs. NGOs are the experts in this field. This NGO expertise takes many forms: education, technical, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and developmental programs, but all apply to humanitarian assistance.<sup>12</sup> In addition to the expertise NGOs provide, they can be a valuable source of information about language, culture, geography, local customs, and intergovernmental relationships.<sup>13</sup> NGO personnel and their expertise can be a force multiplier for the JFC. The JFC must use these organizations to his advantage, and refrain from working at cross purposes. Command and control (C2) of these organizations will rarely, if ever, be the perquisite of the

JFC.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, all players in humanitarian assistance must work towards a consensus that achieves unity of effort towards everyone's particular mission or interest.

While Joint Doctrine acknowledges the importance of working with NGOs, and of developing a positive relationship during crisis management,<sup>15</sup> it does not address establishing that relationship and planning for HA operations before they occur. Joint Doctrine, and most sources on this subject, emphasizes the necessity of establishing liaison and developing a rapport with these groups to facilitate effective management of humanitarian assistance.<sup>16</sup> Each discusses how that positive relationship was key to the success of the mission. What better way to prepare for humanitarian assistance operations of the future, than to establish liaison, review operating procedures, and develop that rapport with NGOs now?

When the U.S. military is called upon to conduct a humanitarian assistance operation, other U.S. government agencies, the host nation, and the NGOs are *in extremis*, that is, only a radical course of action can resolve the situation. There are normally three situations which require the U.S. military to provide humanitarian assistance: (1) natural catastrophe, such as the sudden and swift effects of a tropical cyclone which destroys established infrastructure and overwhelms the local authorities; (2) the level of manmade violence and catastrophe begins to decrease, allowing a return to normalcy, such as in the post-hostilities phase following a war; and (3) the level of manmade violence and catastrophe begins to increase to a level which departs normalcy, when the local authorities lose their ability to maintain control due to the rapid increase in violence or the effects of a long term decay in infrastructure are finally being felt which also overwhelms the local authorities.

When American policy makers turn to the U.S. military there is more to the agenda than just providing humanitarian assistance. Policy makers are looking for a rapid response to end the

hunger, despair, and misery caused by these natural or manmade disasters. They also desire a response which provides for a speedy turn over to civilian organizations once the initial U.S. military effort has been a success. These civilian organizations provide the bridge to transition back to normal conditions and the status quo for the host nation or local authorities. The U.S. military, following the initial response to stabilize the situation, often completes their mission in a supporting role to the NGOs. When conditions permit, the U.S. military turns over responsibility to NGOs or other U.S. government agencies for the return to normalcy.

Why is the U.S. military called upon, and what can they do to assist in these disasters? They provide the initial rapid response in which they draw upon the strengths humanitarian relief organizations look for: rapid response, security, logistics management, and transportation. HA operations occur most often in the developing world because these countries lack the infrastructure to distribute humanitarian aid in a manageable fashion. The U.S. military brings this infrastructure, inherent in their organization.

Why is there a resistance or a perceived resistance of NGOs and U.S. military personnel to work together? The first step in developing a rapport with any organization or group of individuals is finding what each group has in common and building upon those strengths. Often this process will also include resolving *what is perceived* by each of the groups as differences, and overcoming *misperceptions*. A common misperception held by the U.S. military is that NGOs are altruistic liberals with no use for organization. NGOs often have the misperception that those in the U.S. military are hard-nosed soldiers with no conception of, or willingness to understand humanitarian concerns or the outside world. Reality is somewhere in between these two misperceptions. Both organizations are staffed by professionals who have dedicated a period of their lives to conducting operations under some of the most adverse conditions



imaginable. Both face organizational competition for budgets in an austere economic environment. When required, both can focus, work together, and complete their assigned mission. This is what it is all about, successfully completing the mission. Developing a positive working relationship helps to get the job done, faster and more efficiently. Chris Seiple discusses this in his book The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Operations. An NGO representative commented on the "can do attitude" of both the U.S. military and NGOs as a commonality between the two seemingly disparate groups which is responsible for the successful positive working relationship in HA operations.<sup>17</sup>

#### Lessons Learned from Past HA Operations

In April 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was initiated in northern Iraq. The U.S. military was called upon by their policy makers to resolve the developing humanitarian crisis faced by the oppression of the Kurdish ethnic minority by Sadaam Hussein following a failed Kurdish revolt at the end of the Gulf War in Iraq.<sup>18</sup> A security zone was established to halt the fighting and the U.S. military moved in to resolve the situation. Kurdish refugees had fled over the border into the mountains of Turkey and refused to return to their homes in "secured" northern Iraq. A representative of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was sent to coordinate the United States' efforts with those of our allies, coalition partners, and the NGOs in the area. While the U.S. JFC maintained control of the military coalition forces, OFDA managed the overall assistance effort. Relative normalcy was established, the refugees returned to their homes, and the bulk of the U.S. military troops were redeployed. It is important to note that, in humanitarian assistance operations, the U.S. military will most likely be a supporting force, and that the HA operation

will most often be led by another group or agency. This allows the lead agency to draw upon the strengths of the U.S. military, while preparing the transition to the NGOs for management of the humanitarian relief. In this mission, besides the obvious relief efforts, the goal of the military is a short term commitment, transitioning responsibilities to civilian authorities. Seiple quotes members of OFDA: *the military does infrastructure. No programs, and If you [the military] take charge, you can't leave. If you take charge you lose.*<sup>19</sup> In such operations there is no clear cut chain-of-command in the field with respect to civilian organizations or NGOs and the military. A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established to coordinate efforts, clarify tasking and to ensure an overall unity of effort where unity of command did not exist.<sup>20</sup> This established the necessary working relationship between the NGOs and the military. PROVIDE COMFORT was somewhat unusual in that the NGOs weren't in-country prior to the U.S. military, but it was recognized by all that the military could not leave without the participation of the NGOs.

The first lesson learned in this operation was that the CMOC was critical to maintaining a positive working relationship between the U.S. military and NGOs. The second major lesson was that the personal efforts of individuals, i.e. positive personalities, were also key to the success of the relationship. A CMOC must be established early and used as the primary coordination point for the entire NGO/military humanitarian effort. The personnel chosen to fill billets in the CMOC and to interact with the NGOs are equally important. Both the CMOC and the personnel assigned are critical to achieving a positive unity of effort.<sup>21</sup> The U.S. military civil affairs (CA) personnel who staffed the CMOC in northern Iraq are often the same personnel who make up the U.S. military mobile training teams (MTTs) used by Security Assistance Officers throughout the world to conduct training of host nation (HN) forces.

In December 1992, the U.S. military initiated Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia.<sup>22</sup> Following a total break down in infrastructure, law and order, the U.S. military led the United Nations (UN) sponsored humanitarian assistance effort in Somalia. U.S. government efforts were coordinated by Presidential envoy, Ambassador Oakley.<sup>23</sup> This case is somewhat different from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT because the NGOs had been established in Somalia prior to the arrival of the U.S. military. Mass starvation was occurring due to the inability of the NGOs to distribute humanitarian supplies to the populace, largely due to the lack of secure routes of delivery. The U.S. military came in with the clear mission to provide security and improve the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the starving Somalis. In PROVIDE COMFORT, the U.S. military and OFDA were on scene first. However, in RESTORE HOPE, the NGOs were on scene first and were running the show. A consensus and unity of effort was established once again through the use of the CMOC, and although under the umbrella of the authority of the UN, the NGOs played a much greater role in this operation. The humanitarian mission was a success as the degree of starvation and despair was greatly reduced. The United Nations changed the focus of their mission from humanitarian relief and transitioned to a peacekeeping mission and UNOSOM II.<sup>24</sup>

The lessons in this HA operation emphasize the same points as the first case: the CMOC and the personalities of those involved were critical to the successful working relationship between the U.S. military and the NGOs.<sup>25</sup> Due to the greater number of players involved in this operation, an additional lesson is that the personal interest of the JFC is necessary to the success of the whole process. The coordinator of the CMOC must have direct access to the JFC, and the JFC must involve himself in the day to day relations (while still maintaining the "big picture") of

the U.S. military and the NGOs. Also, as with PROVIDE COMFORT, the CA personnel who operated the CMOC were key to the operational effectiveness.

In September 1994, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was carried out in Haiti. This was a generally peaceful, U.S. led multinational effort to restore democratically elected Haitian President Aristide to power.<sup>26</sup> The additional goals of this operation were to *establish a secure environment, provide logistic support, and help civilian organizations plan humanitarian and nation building efforts.*<sup>27</sup> Due to the massive infrastructure deterioration under the military junta and a period UN imposed economic sanctions leading up to the operation, a great amount of effort was focused on humanitarian assistance.

The lessons learned in this operation include the same lessons from the previously discussed cases. It was also recommended to establish a CMOC at the CINC level in addition to that established at the JTF level. This was due to the number and expense of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) projects. In UPHOLD DEMOCRACY there were significant concerns about the complexity of conducting a peace keeping mission while at the same time conducting a humanitarian assistance mission.<sup>28</sup> This recommendation may be an excessive requirement in single mission HA operations, but anything which contributes to maintaining a unity of effort in these complex environments should be highly considered. General Sheehan, the former CINC for U.S. Atlantic Command during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, stated:

*Operations like this require all the energies and capabilities of many U.S. and international agencies over which the military commander has no control. The role of these agencies must be coordinated and defined in advance. The Lesson: interagency rehearsals are mandatory before we put people in harms way.*<sup>29</sup>

As with the previous two operations, the U.S. military civil affairs personnel were significant contributors to the success of the operation.

### The Security Assistance Officer and NGOs

So, how does the U.S. military improve the relationship and their operating procedures with NGOs now, to prepare for the future? As discussed earlier, humanitarian assistance operations are initiated in the developing world and the personnel with the potential to develop the rapport for the military are the CINCs' Security Assistance Officers. These officers, through their position on the U.S. Embassy Country Team,<sup>30</sup> have the ability to work through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to initiate contacts and work with NGOs. USAID is the U.S. government agency that provides economic development and humanitarian assistance to advance United States economic and political interests overseas.<sup>31</sup> USAID works through NGOs to provide this assistance.<sup>32</sup> USAID is also responsible through OFDA for foreign disaster/humanitarian assistance.<sup>33</sup> Using the SAO as the in-country representative of the CINC, this opportunity can lay the groundwork for working together with both USAID and NGOs in future HA operations.

It is appropriate for the CINC to task the SAO to establish a working relationship with NGOs to prepare for future HA operations. Such tasking is appropriate because it falls within the scope of security assistance by meeting one or all of the U.S. foreign policy objectives of security assistance: *(1) building democracy; (2) promoting and maintaining peace; (3) promoting economic growth and sustainable development; (4) addressing global problems; and (5) meeting urgent humanitarian needs.*<sup>34</sup> While within these objectives there is a division of labor between Department of State (DOS), USAID, and the SAO, it is this last objective, *meeting urgent humanitarian needs by supporting private and governmental efforts...and resolution of local conflicts,*<sup>35</sup> which falls most logically into the realm of humanitarian assistance operations. It is

in preparation for HA operations that the Security Assistance Officer serves the foreign policy goals of the Ambassador, while conducting operational planning for his theater CINC.

Some might argue that the SAO has too much to deal with already in managing the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET)<sup>36</sup> accounts to spend the time establishing a rapport with NGOs. This is why the SAO should work through USAID to develop these relationships. USAID will already have a list of pertinent (to HA operations) NGOs and will themselves have established varying degrees of rapport with each of these groups. A face to face meeting, a handshake, and the exchange of points of contact information can go a long way to establishing a rapport. The SAO will further this relationship on behalf of the CINC and future JFCs by employing U.S. military mobile training teams to work with selected NGOs. The personnel who make up these MTTs may often be the same civil affairs personnel who will staff the CMOC in future HA operations. This is something which will not be conducted in a vacuum, but coordinated closely with other members of the Country Team. These MTTs, while normally in-country for the purpose of working with host nation forces, can follow-up a training mission with an HCA project<sup>37</sup> in coordination with the NGO. Based on the interaction between the SAO, the MTTs, the Country Team, host nation forces, and the NGOs, the Security Assistance Officer can begin to establish a working relationship which will be invaluable to the JFC should a humanitarian crisis occur. The SAO can use MTTs or other temporary duty personnel to conduct CMOC exercises and to develop memorandums of understanding (MOUs) which can be used to give the U.S. military and the NGOs a basis for their relationship.

Another concern might be the effect on the working relationship between the SAO and HN forces, as the SAO is often in the position of working closely on a daily basis with the security

forces of the particular country to which he is assigned. Often the SAO is provided office space within the HN forces facilities.<sup>38</sup> This HN relationship can be used as an added benefit to developing liaison with NGOs. The SAO is in a position to positively influence the working relationship between HN forces and the resident NGOs. This activity would not only develop the rapport, but would also provide additional HN forces for future JFCs to use as force multipliers and local liaison. It would further the national security interests of the United States by encouraging a spirit of cooperation between HN forces and the NGOs assisting in the development of that nation as well as reinforcing a respect for human rights within the HN forces.

Members of these MTTs, as well as past SAOs, could be recalled to fill positions on the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff and to assist the JFC in a future HA operation by establishing the CMOC and reinitiating liaison with the NGOs. Due to the regional expertise of the CA personnel who make up the MTTs, more likely than not, they will be the same personnel manning the CMOC in an actual HA operation.

How do the CINC's efforts pay off in a country that doesn't have an SAO when a humanitarian assistance operation must be initiated? The larger and more prominent NGOs are generally international organizations whose personnel work in many countries based on the need for support.<sup>39</sup> They are transferred to different developing world trouble spots, much as U.S. military personnel are transferred to different posts.<sup>40</sup> When a CINC establishes a JTF, commanded by the JFC in a country without an SAO, chances are that the NGO personnel assigned to the humanitarian crisis will have worked with the U.S. military somewhere else in the world.

The Security Assistance Officers throughout a CINC's AOR can become more significant assets in operational planning for humanitarian assistance operations. A SAO's preparation and liaison can assist the U.S. Ambassador with a quick response to humanitarian crises and requests for assistance from host nations. Establishing a positive working relationship between the U.S. military and NGOs throughout the world should be part of every CINC's Theater Engagement Plan and when catastrophe strikes, will provide future Joint Force Commanders with the tools to get the job done.

### Conclusion

Humanitarian assistance operations continue to be a high priority for American policy makers as a key part of the United States National Security Strategy, especially in reinforcing and supporting developing democracies abroad. The U.S. military and the unified CINCs will be called upon to assist in times of natural or manmade catastrophe because of the U.S. military's renown ability to respond rapidly to contingencies around the globe. The U.S. military should be prepared to excel in future HA operations. A close positive working relationship between the U.S. military and NGOs has been shown to be the key to the success of HA operations. The U.S. military will normally work in a supporting role to NGOs and must be comfortable with this relationship. The JFC must work well with the NGOs to ensure a timely transition to civilian agencies, so that the military forces can depart. The JFC can use the NGOs to his advantage as a force multiplier because of their unique humanitarian expertise.

The CINCs have the ability to use the Security Assistance Officers throughout the developing nations in their AOR to establish this working relationship with NGOs today. Tasking the SAOs with the mission to work closely with USAID, establish liaison with the NGOs, develop MOUs,



and exercise HA operations procedures through the use of MTTs is well within the guidelines of the current security assistance program. The SAO must work through the Country Team, balancing the dual chain-of-command with both the Ambassador and the CINC to accomplish U.S. foreign policy and prepare for military contingencies. This author contends that if the CINCs and Ambassadors enhance and encourage this SAO relationship with NGOs, then they can be significantly more effective to a JFC in future HA operations.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Operations, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Peacekeeping Institute, 1996), p. 4.
- <sup>2</sup> Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, 14<sup>th</sup> ed, (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute of Security Assistance, April 1994), pp.105-112, (Reprint, NWC 2016).
- <sup>3</sup> Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, p. 105.
- <sup>4</sup> John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The Gap, and Things that Go Bump in the Night", Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 4, No. 3, (London, UK: Frank Cass and Company Limited, Winter 1995), pp. 375-379, (Reprint, NWC 3077).
- <sup>5</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Joint Pub 3-07, Washington, D.C.: 16 June 1995), p. I-1.
- <sup>6</sup> President, National Security Strategy for a New Century. (Washington, D.C.: May 1997), p.20.
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Joint Pub 5-0, Washington, D.C.: 13 April 1995), p. I-6).
- <sup>8</sup> Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, p. 98.
- <sup>9</sup> Author's note; in discussions with various U.S. military officers at the Naval War College, the term NGO was more easily recognizable to the majority of officers who had conducted HA missions.
- <sup>10</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, pp. II-1 – II-8.
- <sup>11</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, p. II-3.
- <sup>12</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I & II, (Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996), Vol. I, pp. II-18 – II-19.
- <sup>13</sup> Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. I, pp. III-11 – III-13.
- <sup>14</sup> Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. I, p. II-18.
- <sup>15</sup> Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. I, pp. III-6 – III-11.
- <sup>16</sup> Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. I, p. III-16.
- <sup>17</sup> Seiple, p. 22.
- <sup>18</sup> Seiple, p. 21.
- <sup>19</sup> Seiple, p. 58.

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<sup>20</sup> Seiple, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> Seiple, p. 61-63.

<sup>22</sup> Seiple, p. 97-98.

<sup>23</sup> Seiple, p. 98.

<sup>24</sup> Seiple, p. 98.

<sup>25</sup> Seiple, pp. 169-170.

<sup>26</sup> USACOM, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Joint After Action Report (JAAR), (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Atlantic Command, June 29, 1995), p. 2.

<sup>27</sup> USACOM, p. 52.

<sup>28</sup> USACOM, p. 53.

<sup>29</sup> USACOM, p. i.

<sup>30</sup> Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, p. 105.

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Agency for International Development, "About USAID", U.S. Agency for International Development, January 20, 1999, <http://www.info.usaid.gov/about>, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> Joint Pub 3-08, p. II-11.

<sup>34</sup> Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, pp. 41-44.

<sup>37</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, p. III-10.

<sup>38</sup> Author's note: the MAAG in the Dominican Republic is located in Dominican military facilities, as with others in Latin America.

<sup>39</sup> Joint Pub 3-08, pp. II-18 – II-19.

<sup>40</sup> Author's note: while assigned as Coast Guard Liaison Officer to the U.S. Embassy in Haiti, I had many informal discussions with various NGO & PVO personnel throughout the course of my daily business which supported this statement. For example; members of CARE and Feed the Children regularly rotated between Haiti and Ethiopia.

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